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Abstract Given the assumption that selection is a strictly local relationship between
a head and its complement, we expect the ability of a head to take a particular
argument to be insensitive to linguistic material above that head. The verb believe
poses a puzzle under this view: while believe ordinarily only permits declarative
clausal complements, interrogative complements are allowed when believe occurs
under clausal negation and can or will, and a veridical reading becomes available.
I argue that this provides evidence that believe is not simply a standard Hintikkan
representational belief verb, but rather is fundamentally question-embedding,and
that the verb’s lexical semantics, including an excluded middle presupposition,
interact with the modal and negation to derive the veridicality of can’t believe. I
additionally conclude that veridicality need not be lexical: the right mix of semantic
ingredients can conspire to yield a veridical interpretation, even if those ingredients
are distributed across multiple lexical items.
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1 Introduction
The English clausal-embedding verb believe ordinarily permits declarative comple-
ments and bans interrogative complements:
(1) a. Susan believes that Ehrenrang was obliterated by the meteor.
b. *Susan believes which town was obliterated by the meteor.
This asymmetry is historically explained as resulting from s(emantic)-selection
(Grimshaw 1979; Pesetsky 1982, 1991): believe selects propositions (type 〈s, t〉), not
questions (type 〈〈s, t〉, t〉), so it can only compose with clausal complements which
are proposition-denoting, i.e., declaratives but not interrogatives.
* This work has benefited immensely from advice from debate and discussions with Pranav Anand,
Donka Farkas, and Jim McCloskey, as well as conversations with Maayan Abenina-Adar, Kajsa
Djärv, Deniz Özyıldız, Floris Roelofsen, Benjamin Spector, and Nadine Theiler, and audiences at
UCSC, UC Berkeley, and SALT 29. Errors are, believably, all my own.
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However, when believe occurs under a combination of can or will and negation1,
interrogative complements are licit–which neither negation nor modals easily achieve
on their own:
(2) Susan {can’t/*can/*doesn’t} believe which town was obliterated by the
meteor.
Assuming that selection is strictly local, these observations are puzzling. If a head
is capable of selecting complements of a particular type in some context, it should
(at least in principle) be able to select those kinds of complements freely, regardless
of what material is above it. We must ask why, then, believe permits interrogative
complements only in certain contexts.
Further complicating the picture is that while wh-interrogatives are acceptable
complements of can’t believe, polar interrogatives are not (Lahiri 2002; Egré 2008):
(3) *Susan {can’t/won’t} believe whether Ehrenrang was obliterated by the
meteor.
Finally, and perhaps most strikingly, can’t believe is veridical with declarative
complements: it gives rise to the inference that its complement is true, starkly unlike
believe on its own or under only negation:
(4) a. Mary can’t believe that it’s raining.
∴ It’s raining.
b. Mary (doesn’t) believe(s) that it’s raining.
∴ It’s raining.
It is not obvious why the addition of a modal and negation should yield veridical
interpretations for believe. Other close semantic kin of believe, such as think, In this
paper, I will propose a compositional solution to these puzzles.
Specifically, I will argue that the apparent sensitivity of believe’s selectional
restrictions to linguistic context is attributed not to selection itself, but rather a
complex interaction between its component parts. The first is that, following Theiler,
Roelofsen & Aloni (2018), believe lexically selects for questions (that is, sets
of sets of worlds), contra a Hintikkan (1962)-style view in which it selects for
propositions. Instead of believe q being ruled out for selectional reasons, it is
generally unacceptable because in most circumstances it systematically produces
trivial meanings (cf. Mayr 2017, 2019; Theiler et al. 2018). The veridicality of can’t
believe, then, is derived compositionally from a conspiratorial interaction between
an excluded middle presupposition (Bartsch 1973; Gajewski 2007) an agent-oriented
1 I call this construction can’t believe throughout.
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modal, and negation. We need not package veridicality (or perhaps even factivity)
with the lexical entries of particular clausal-embedding predicates; it may arise given
the right combination of semantic ingredients spread out across multiple lexical
items.
The paper is structured as follows: §2 provides reasons why can’t believe should
be understood compositionally, §3 sharpens the range of possible meanings that can’t
believe may have, §4 provides the compositional analysis, §5 discusses possible
alternatives to that analysis, and §6 concludes.
2 Why treat can’t believe as compositional?
Given that can’t believe is so different from believe on its own, we might be tempted
to treat can’t believe as some kind of atomic predicate, rather than derive its meaning
compositionally. I believe a compositional account to be preferable for at least two
reasons. First, a similar pattern is observed in other languages. In the examples
given below, the interpretation of can’t believe is roughly the same as in the English
paraphrase: 2
(5) Je
I
ne
NEG
peux
can
pas
NEG
croire
believe
qui
who
a
has
gagné
won
la
the
course.
race
‘I can’t believe who won the race.’ (French)
(6) Ik
I
kan
can
niet
not
geloven
believe
wie
who
de
the
race
race
gewonnen
won
heeft.
has
‘I can’t believe who won the race.’ (Dutch)
(7) Ma
I
ei
NEG
suuda
can.NEG
uskuda(=gi),
believe.INF(=even)
kes
who
on
is
võitnud
won
valimised.
election
‘I can’t (even) believe who won the election.’ (Estonian)
(8) Džon
John
ne
NEG
može
can
po-viriti,
PERF-believe
v
in
te,
that
šcˇo
that
Mariya
Maria
vigrala
win.PAST
gonku.
race.ACC
‘John can’t believe that Maria won the race.’ (Ukrainian; Anelia Kudin, p.c.)
2 In some languages, including Turkish, Setswana, Malay, Hungarian, and Hebrew, a similar construc-
tion to can’t believe is licensed with negation + believe, without an overt modal:
(i) Nereye
where
kadar
extent
yüzmüs¸s¸ün
swam.2SG
ki
COMP
inanmtyorum.
believe.NEG.PRES.1SG
‘I can’t (lit. don’t) believe how far you swam!’ (Turkish; Michaelis 2001: 1043)
I leave the interesting question of how these languages might differ from languages like English as a
question which merits much further investigation.
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If can’t believe in English is idiomatic, then we would presumably be forced to
stipulate the same idiomaticity in other languages, and we would be left with no
explanation of the cross-linguistic similarity. On the other hand, if the behavior
of can’t believe could be explained compositionally, then we would expect similar
patterns to the English one to show up in other languages.
A second, though perhaps less compelling reason, is that certain meaning-
preserving lexical substitutions in can’t believe are also veridical and license inter-
rogative complements:
(9) a. It’s unbelievable who’s lecturing us about fake news.3
b. My appetite fled as I sat rigidly in my seat, unable to believe who was
next to me.4
c. Everyone who was present that night was incapable of believing why
UEFA allocated this stadium for a European Cup final.
These facts suggest that can’t believe is unlikely to be an English-specific idiom,
but rather poses a compositional problem that reflects a deeper property of believe
and its equivalents in other languages which warrants a non-stipulative explanation.
3 Core properties of can’t believe
3.1 Veridicality inferences
Perhaps the most striking property of can’t believe is that it is veridical with respect
to its complement: it generates an inference that that complement is true. A speaker
who utters (10), for example, is almost certainly understood to be committed to
today being Tuesday.
(10) I can’t believe that today is only Tuesday.
What makes this surprising, however, is this meaning is decidedly counterintuitive
when one considers the meaning of the subparts of can’t believe: on its face, (10)
is an assertion that it is impossible for the speaker to believe that today is Tuesday.
Intuitively, can’t believe highlights a ‘tension’ between a speaker’s belief in some
proposition p despite their extreme surprise at p’s truth (cf. Sæbø 2007). But if this
is the case, where does the inference that the speaker believes it to be Tuesday come
from? In this section, I will explore the extent to which veridicality is and is not
available with can’t believe with both declarative and interrogative complements.
3 http://www.wibc.com/blogs/tony-katz/morning-news/its-unbelievable-whos-lecturing-us-a
bout-fake-news
4 http://thechronicleherald.ca/artslife/1523575-david-cassidy-club-med-and-me-%E2%80%98
c%E2%80%99mon-get-happy%E2%80%99
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3.1.1 With declarative complements
One way a veridical inference might be generated is presuppositionally. This appears
to be the case for factive verbs like know, which do tend to presuppose the truth of
their complements (Kiparsky & Kiparsky 1970: et seq.). We can be reasonably sure
that these are presuppositions because they project:
(11) John doesn’t know that we’re planning a surprise party for him.
Presupposed: We’re planning a surprise party for John
Out of the blue can’t believe is generally veridical, whether with first- or third-person
subjects5:
(12) I/Susan can’t believe that it’s raining.
∴ It’s raining.
However, there are some contexts in which can’t believe p does not seem to carry
a veridical inference, but rather emphasize the impossibility of the attitude holder
believing p.
(13) No matter how hard the prosecutor tries to convince him, John can’t believe
that Mary is the murderer. He was with her on the other side of the town at
the time of the crime.
Given that can’t believe p can be used non-veridically, it also stands to reason that
can’t believe is perhaps not best characterized as factive, since examples like (13)
would involve violating this factive presupposition.
Nevertheless, while can’t believe p may not always be veridical, the picture that
emerges is one in which the veridicality inference may be overridden only in highly
specific contexts.6
3.1.2 Interrogative complements
Guerzoni & Sharvit (2007: G&S) propose two distinct notions of ‘factivity’ for
predicates which embed questions, depending on from whose perspective the com-
plement is true. A predicate v is speaker-factive iff x v q presupposes that the
speaker knows the true answer to q, and v subject-factive iff x v q presupposes that
x knows the true answer to q.
5 Here second-person subjects are excluded because it is generally infelicitous to make assertions about
what addressees do or do not believe.
6 I sidestep the interesting and almost certainly important question of the role prosody may play in
cases where the veridical inference is canceled.
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While we saw from examples like (13) that factivity is altogether perhaps a bit
too strong a notion for can’t believe, it’s worth considering whether can’t believe
is subject- or speaker-veridical. G&S and Guerzoni (2007) argue that emotive
factives like surprise, which bear an intuitive semantic similarity to can’t believe, are
speaker-factive on the basis of examples like (14), which they argue are infelicitous
if the speaker does not know who passed the exam, as in (14). At first brush, the
same seems to be true for can’t believe (15).
(14) It will surprise Bill who passed the exam.
(15) Bill won’t believe who passed the exam.
However, the infelicity of uttering (14) or (15) if the speaker does not know who
passed the exam does not seem to be semantic. While uttering (15) out of the blue is
likely to generate the inference that speaker is aware of who passed, this requirement
can disappear in the right context. Romero (2015) challenges Guerzoni’s claim for
surprise, and her example extends quite naturally to can’t believe:
(16) A: Hi John, do you know who was at the party?
B: No, but I can tell you Bill couldn’t believe who was there. (cf. Romero
2015: (74))
Subject-factivity, on the other hand, seems indefeasible for can’t believe with an
interrogative complement. Following up a can’t believe q assertion with an explicit
denial of subject knowledge of the answer to q is incoherent:
(17) Lorraine can’t believe which country is holding the World Cup. #In fact,
she has no idea where it will be.
But calling it subject factivity is still a bit too strong. The subject need not be
committed to the true answer itself, but simply be convinced of their own rightness,
even if the speaker believes otherwise, as demonstrated in (18).
(18) Two parents normally give their daughter presents for Christmas addressed
from themselves, but this year, they decided to give her a bunch of gifts from
’Santa.’ She did not expect that Santa would be bringing her gifts, but she
readily accepts it. One parent says to the other:
She can’t believe who brought her so many gifts this year.
Based upon this evidence, I will characterize the presupposition associated with
can’t believe q as subject-certainty: the subject believes that they know the true
answer to q.
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3.2 Permissible interrogative complements
Veridical predicates across the board tend to allow both declarative and interrogative
complements (Spector & Egré 2015), but do not themselves form a completely
homogenous class.7
The so-called ‘emotive factives’ like regret and surprise differ from ‘doxastic
factives’ like know in that only the emotive factives disallow polar interrogative
complements:
(19) Shawna knows/*regrets whether it’s raining.
Can’t believe patterns like the emotive factives in this regard:
(20) *I can’t believe whether it’s raining.
Though a unified treatment of can’t believe and emotive factives is outside the scope
of this paper, I note here that mirative expressions like be surprised and be amazed,
which seem to carry roughly similar meanings to can’t believe, are also emotive
factives. These similarities certainly invite further scrutiny.
3.3 The role of negation
Finally, I will note that sentential negation per se is not necessary to license a
veridicality inference with believe. Can believe is compatible with interrogative
complements in polar questions and with adversative adverbs.
(21) Can/would you believe which dessert Sherrod baked?
(22) I can *(hardly/scarcely/barely) believe what score I got on the midterm!
Like can’t believe, however, neither of these constructions straightforwardly entail
7 Several authors treat interrogative complements of can’t believe not as true interrogatives, but rather
exclamatives (Elliott 1971, 1974; Grimshaw 1979). However, some clausal complements of can’t
believe show properties consistent with being interrogative and not exclamative, including containing
multiple wh-words (i) or sluices (ii):
(i) Joan can’t believe who confiscated who is how tall.
(ii) Someone brought a tarte tatin to the potluck, though I couldn’t believe who.
While some complements of can’t believe might be exclamative, I take the evidence above to indicate
that at least some must be genuine interrogatives. See Huddleston (1993) for further arguments.
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that there is a particular p that the subject believes.8
3.4 Summary
Can’t believe displays a set of properties highly reminiscent of emotive factives: It
is veridical with declarative complements, carries a speaker-certainty presupposition
with interrogative complements, and disallows polar interrogative complements.
4 Analysis
Can’t believe is evidently comprised of multiple contentful parts, which when
combined, create a complex predicate whose properties (namely veridicality and the
ability to embed interrogatives) is not easily predicted from the sum of its parts. That
said, a close examination he properties of these individual components may provide
a clue as to our original puzzles. The principal idea I will advance is twofold: believe
lexically selects not for propositions but sets of propositions, and the intuitive tension
of can’t believe represents an apparent conflict between two types of content: a
veridical presupposition and a modalized antiveridical assertion.
4.1 Selectional properties of the verb
We have established believe is freely compatible with declarative complements, but
has only permits interrogative complements in a fairly constrained set of contexts.
The classical view of believe from doxastic logics inspired by Hintikka (1962) is
that it is proposition-taking (and therefore declarative-embedding), having a lexical
entry along the lines of (23).
(23) JbelieveKw = λpstλx.DOXwx ⊆ p
This denotation, though perhaps a bit simplistic, captures a core intuition about
what it means to believe: an individual ‘believes’ a proposition if that proposition is
entailed by their doxastic state DOX, the set of worlds compatible with their beliefs.
However, the fact that under this view believe requires a propositional argument
is problematic, since we know that believe can take interrogative complements, albeit
only in a proper subset of linguistic contexts (i.e. under something like can’t or
won’t) in which it may also take declaratives.
Adopting the assumption that propositions denote sets of worlds (type st) and
interrogatives denote sets of propositions (type 〈st, t〉), by s-selection, predicates
8 It is, however, the case that (21) seems to be felicitous only if the speaker has a particular belief about
which dessert Sherrod baked, and doesn’t require the addressee to know what Sherrod baked. It is
possible that this interrogative construction might motivate a distinct treatment from can’t believe.
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should be able to embed only one or the other. This is a problem more general than
believe, as many other predicates (the so-called ‘responsive predicates’) can also
embed both types of clauses, including know and say.
Prior work has typically utilized one of two strategies to solve this selectional
problem without sacrificing the type-driven notion of s-selection. REDUCTIVE
accounts aim to unify the meaning of declaratives and interrogatives either reducing
interrogative meaning to declarative meaning (Karttunen 1977; Groenendijk &
Stokhof 1982, 1984; Heim 1994; Lahiri 2002; Egré 2008; Spector & Egré 2015:
a.o.) or vice versa (Uegaki 2016; Elliott, Klinedinst, Sudo & Uegaki 2017; Roberts
2018: a.o.). On the other hand, UNIFIED accounts treat declaratives and interrogatives
as type-equivalent, so responsive predicates pose no problem at all, as in Inquisitive
Semantics (Ciardelli, Groenendijk & Roelofsen 2013; Theiler et al. 2018).
In this section, I will demonstrate how a particular Unified account–namely,
the Inquisitive Semantics treatment of Theiler et al. (2018)–can account for the
selectional behavior of can’t believe; in §5 I will discuss issues that the REDUCTIVE
accounts face for accounting for the behavior of can’t believe.
For Theiler et al., the denotation of declarative and interrogative clauses alike is a
downward-closed set of propositions (henceforth, type T ). For believe in particular,
they propose a semantics which is broadly Hintikkan in nature: it predicates that the
subject’s doxastic state is a member of the set denoted by the complement of believe.
(24) JbelieveKw = λPTλxe.DOXwx ∈ P (Theiler et al. 2018: 7)
This account is intuitively appealing because it permits believe to take interrogative
complements without any type-shfiting. It also provides an explanation for why
these complements are ordinarily unacceptable, explained below.
4.1.1 Whence subject-veridicality?
Though believe is not obligatorily veridical, it is a neg-raising verb (Zuber 1982):
¬believe p is typically interpreted to mean believe ¬p.
(25) John doesn’t believe that it is raining.
∴ John believes that it is not raining.
This inference can be cashed out as a ‘excluded middle’ presupposition: believe
presupposes that the subject believes either p or ¬p (Bartsch 1973; Gajewski 2002).
Theiler et al. propose a similar presupposition augmented for Inquisitive Se-
mantics. Because ¬ applies only to propositions, they must innovate a higher-order
negation ¬ :
(26) ¬ P := {p|∀q ∈ P : p∩q = /0}
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Whereas ¬p is defined as the set of all not-p worlds not, ¬ P is defined as the set of
all sets of worlds which are not in any members of P. An important consequence of
this definition is that ¬ applied to an interrogative clause yields the empty set under
the assumption that interrogative clauses denote partitions over a set of worlds:
(27) Jwho won the electionK = {{A won}, {B won}, ... {Z won}}
With this in mind, consider Theiler et al.’s denotation for believe with an Inquisitive
excluded middle presupposition (underlined):
(28) JbelieveKw = λPTλx : DOXwx ∈ P∨ DOXwx ∈ ¬ P. DOXwx ∈ P (Theiler et al.
2018: 7)
When P is interrogative, the EM presupposition reduces to DOXwx ∈ P, and the
presupposed content of believe P becomes identical to its asserted content; i.e., the
presupposition is completely trivial. I argue produces a systematic trivality, and is
therefore unacceptable, inspired by Gajewski’s (2002) L-Analyticity:9
(29) BAN ON ASSERTING TRIVIALITIES (BATS)
For an utterance u, if u contains a clausal constituent with presupposed
content ρ and at-issue content α , u is ungrammatical if ρ ⊆ α or ρ ∩α = /0.
Because x believe q involves an assertion which is obviated by the presupposition,
it is systematically trivial and therefore predicted by BATS to be ungrammatical.
Similarly, in the case of don’t believe, the presupposed content systematically
contradicts the asserted content, again producing ungrammaticality.
Thus, with an Inquisitive modification of fairly standard semantics for believe,
we can understand why believe is generally allergic to interrogative complements,
while still not ruling out believe q for reasons of selection.
4.2 The modal
It’s not the case that any modal will license this use of believe. For instance, we
cannot substitute must, have to, or should for can and yield acceptability:
9 Theiler et al. explain this fact using L-Analyticity itself:
(i) L-ANALYTICITY
An LF constituent α of type t is L-analytic iff the logical skeleton of α receives the same
denotation under every variable assignment. (Gajewski 2002: 28)
Although this is intuitively quite similar, I present the modified version above because L-Analyticity
makes the unwelcome prediction that if believe q is L-Analytic, then any operators above believe q
won’t be able to produce a grammatical sentence, which is inadequate for the data here.
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(30) *I {must not/don’t have to/shouldn’t} believe who came to the party.
In addition to can, will + negation also similarly licenses this use of believe, e.g. in
‘clickbait’ headlines:
(31) You’ll never believe what J.J. Abrams wrote before Star Wars.
What is special about can and will? They both have uses that require their comple-
ment took effort to achieve (Karttunen 1971; Bhatt 1999). In a nutshell, x can VP
indicates that in the worlds where x has the same essential characteristic as in the
actual world and applies their abilities to the fullest, x brings VP about.
Drawing from Kratzer (1981); Kaufmann (2012); Castroviejo & Oltra-Massuet
(2018), I assume here that the modal can existentially quantifies over the best worlds
in a modal base fdispo describing the subject’s intrinsic qualities (‘disposition’) in w
relative to an ordering source gAB defined as follows:
(32) JcanKw = λR〈s,eT 〉λxe: ∃us.u ∈ BEST( fdispo(w)(x),gAB).[R(u)(x)]
a. fdispo is a function from 〈w,x〉 pairs into a set of propositions that
describe the inner make-up (i.e. individual characteristics) of x in w.
∩ fdispo is the proposition containing exactly those worlds where x has
the same inner make-up as in w.
b. gAB is a function from 〈w,x〉 pairs into a set of propositions that de-
scribes states of affairs where x ‘applies their strength of body, charac-
ter or intellect’.
c. BEST is a function which takes modal base, ordering source pairs 〈 f ,g〉
and returns the set of worlds w∈∩ f such that for all w′ ∈∩ f , w≤g w′.
(See Portner 2009)
In short: x can R means that there is some best world compatible with x’s intrinsic
characteristics in w where x exerts the extent of their abilities and brings R about. In
the following section, I will delineate how this modal can compose with believe, and
how it can help us understand the full range of interpretations of can’t believe.
4.3 Deriving the behavior of can believe
To see how our modal semantics interacts with believe, consider can believe with a
declarative complement. An example is given below with an assumed LF.
(33) a. Beatrice can believe that Fran won the election.
b. LF: [B [can [believe [F won the election]]]]
An intuitive paraphrase of (33) might be something like, ‘Beatrice finds it plausible
675
Roberts
that Fran won the election’. It does not, however, require that Beatrice be committed
to the truth of that complement. If we utilize the semantics given above here, we
yield a meaning for (33) as follows:
(34) Derivation of (33):
a. JF won the electionKw = P
b. Jbelieve F won the electionKw = λxe : DOXwx ∈ P∨ DOXwx ∈ ¬ P. DOXwx ∈
P
c. Jcan believe F won the electionKw = λxe : DOXwx ∈ P∨ DOXwx ∈ ¬ P.∃u∈
BEST( fdispo(w)(x),gAB(w)(x)).[DOXux ∈ P]
d. JB can believe F won the electionKw =DOXwb ∈ P∨ DOXwb ∈ ¬ P.∃u∈
BEST( fdispo(w)(b),gAB(w)(b)).[DOXub ∈ P]
This more or less matches our intuitions: there is a world where Beatrice can apply
her might and come to the conclusion that Fran won the election.
Can believe with an interrogative complement, as in (35), is unacceptable:
(35) a. *Beatrice can believe who won the election.
b. JB can believe who won the electionKw =DOXwb ∈ Q.∃u∈ BEST( fdispo(w)(b),
gAB(w)(b)).[DOXub ∈ Q]
Our current semantics does not predict (35) to be ungrammatical. Rather, it assigns it
a meaning along the lines of "there is an ideal world in which Beatrice is opinionated
about the election", which is not contradictory in the least.
However, can believe q utterances are licit in certain contexts, e.g., in response
to can’t believe q utterances:
(36) A: I can’t believe who won the election!
B: [I]F can believe who won the election.
Thus, it seems desirable not to render can’t believe q utterances ungrammatical
wholesale. Nevertheless, out of the blue, (35) seems bad. Why? A possible
explanation lies in the pragmatics of making an assertion like (35).
Here, the speaker presupposes subject-certainty about q–that Beatrice has an
opinion about the outcome of the election–in w and asserts this certainty is possible
in the worlds where Beatrice applies her abilities to the fullest. But this assertion
is quite odd: it effectively communicates only that w is an ideal world with respect
to Beatrice’s ability to be opinionated about the election. The ideality of w for this
purpose is only relevant in situations where we have some reason to doubt Beatrice’s
abilities in this regard.
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Thus, can believe q is generally licit only in contexts where the ‘believability’
of the embedded question is somehow in question, which are specific pragmatic
circumstances. If the validity of the election outcome is dubious, the acceptability of
(35) improves:
(37) Archibald, Beatrice, and Consuela are international observers for a con-
tested election in a country with a history of government corruption. They
stumble upon evidence that there was ballot-stuffing involved.
A: Do you think the results are legitimate?
C: Beatrice can believe who won the election, but I find the huge margin of
victory is awfully suspicious.
Given this, it would in fact be desirable not to rule out can believe q across the board,
but rather understand its general unacceptability as arising from pragmatic oddity.
4.4 Can’t believe
Finally, we want can’t believe to be acceptable with both declarative and interrogative
complements, as well as generate the appropriate veridicality inferences. First
consider the declarative case:
(38) a. Beatrice can’t believe that Fran won the election.
b. J¬B can believe F won the electionKw =DOXwb ∈ P∨ DOXwb ∈ ¬ P.@u∈
BEST( fdispo(w)(b),gAB(w)(b)).[DOXub ∈ P]
Here, the speaker asserts that there is no ideal world in which Beatrice believes that
Fran won the election. This is the core tension: Beatrice has a belief, but that belief
is non-ideal.
What might give us pause here is that this denotation does not place any restric-
tions on Beatrice’s beliefs in w, since there is no reduction of the EM presupposition.
Why this is troublesome is that (38-a) is most naturally understood as indicating that
Fran does indeed believe that Beatrice won.
To understand why this is the case, consider both possible beliefs that Beatrice
could have about Fran’s victory. If Beatrice does believe that Fran won, (38-a) gives
rise to the inference that she did not expect that outcome:
(39) Beatrice (still) can’t believe that Fran won the election. Fran never stood a
chance, yet there she was on CSPAN taking the oath of office.
On the other hand, if Beatrice doesn’t believe that Fran won, (38-a) can be used to
emphasize the sheer impossibility of that belief:
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(40) Beatrice can’t believe that Fran won the election. She inspected every ballot
herself and knows that Fran lost.
In both of these situations, Beatrice believing that Fran won is ‘non-ideal’:
• In (39), Fran’s victory is shocking/unexpected.
• In (40), Fran’s victory is false, and therefore incompatible with B’s abilities
in w
Because the EM presupposition does not reduce, (38-a) is utterable whether
Beatrice truly believes Fran won or not.
Turning at last to interrogative complements, the results are quite similar, with
the notable exception that the EM presupposition reduces:
(41) a. Beatrice can’t believe who won the election.
b. J¬B can believe who won the electionKw =DOXwb ∈ Q.@u ∈ BEST(
fdispo(w)(b),gAB(w)(b)).[DOXub ∈ Q]
Here, speaker certainty is again presupposed by virtue of this reduction. As discussed
in §3, this is precisely what we want: an utterance of can’t believe q is simply
impossible if the subject of believe is unopinionated about q. However, the meaning
of (41) is not systematically trivial.
The core insight here is that the subject is presupposed to be opinionated about
q in the actual world, while simultaneously asserted that in no ideal world are they
opinionated about q. Thus, they are making a statement that the actual world is
non-ideal.
4.4.1 What is an ‘ideal belief’?
When an agent is faced with a piece of new information, how do they update their
beliefs? Whether they do and how depends on two primary factors: their existing
beliefs and the quality of evidence. Anyone who is trying to figure out whether to
believe a new proposition p is going to have to square it with what they already think
is true.
Belief update is an extremely fundamental component of linguistic communi-
cation, and generally goes off without a hitch. However, rational agents are still
discriminating creatures: they will not believe any old proposition that comes their
way. For instance, there is no reason to believe propositions for which there is
insufficient evidence, nor can one rationally believe two propositions that they know
to be mutually exclusive.
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I propose that, generally speaking, when deciding whether to integrate a propo-
sition into their beliefs, agents consider (at least) whether its adoption a) would
result in an inconsistent belief state, b) has compelling evidence to support it, and c)
would require other existing beliefs to be discarded. We can formalize this as a set
of maxims that all rational agents aim to adhere to when updating their beliefs, as in
(42).10
(42) Maxims of belief revision
1. MAXIM OF CONSISTENCY: Do not have an inconsistent belief state
(i.e., do not believe propositions p and q such that p∩ q = /0). (Al-
chourrón, Gärdenfors & Makinson 1985)
2. MAXIM OF EVIDENTIALITY: Believe that for which there is extremely
good evidence. (Doyle 1979: et seq.)
3. MAXIM OF CONSERVATION: Do not revise existing beliefs. (Gärden-
fors & Makinson 1988)
Unfortunately, the world sometimes fails to comport according to our beliefs, and
we cannot always obey all these maxims. Suppose that I have lived my entire life
in a windowless room, and based upon everything I know about the world, I have
a firm belief that the sky is orange. I step outside and I am stunned to see with my
own eyes that the sky is blue! This poses a direct challenge to my beliefs, so I should
perform some kind of belief revision.
I could simply add the sky is blue to my beliefs, but (let’s assume) that the sky is
blue and the sky is orange cannot be true at the same time. Given the assumption
of rationality, it seems unlikely that agents would ever entertain belief states they
consider inconsistent: that is to say, the Maxim of Consistency is inviolable. Adding
a contradictory belief to my doxastic state does not seem like a particularly good
choice.
Another option is to violate the Maxim of Evidentiality and reject believing that
the sky is blue and go on believing that it is orange. But to do so would require me
not to believe my own eyes, which also seems fairly irrational: we want to follow
extremely good evidence where it leads. I could gin up post-hoc rationalizations for
my sensory experience (my eyes are playing tricks on me, etc.), but this stubborn
refusal to accept manifest reality is also not particularly rational.
My only choice, then, is to give up of some my existing beliefs. I could adopt
the belief that the sky is blue with no further problems by giving up my belief that
10 There are many ways of cashing out this intuition formally, e.g. as a set of ranked Optimality-
Theoretic constraints. I do not make the claim that this is an exclusive list of all that an agent
considers when performing belief updates, just the minimum set of maxims to illustrate what a
non-ideal belief of the relevant sort might consist of.
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the sky is orange. Of course, to do so violates Conservation, but I have no choice: I
either have to be irrational and heinously violate one of the other Maxims, or I have
to discard my long-held believe that the sky is orange. I would be licensed to utter
(43) in this context:
(43) I can’t believe what color the sky is.
Given that can’t believe q carries a presupposition of speaker certainty, we now have
a way of understanding the pragmatic factors which govern its use. Can’t believe q,
then, is only uttered felicitously when the subject of believe cannot follow all the
maxims, but nevertheless believes some particular answer to q. In effect, the only
maxim they can give up is Conservation, yielding an effect of ‘surprise’.
5 Some alternative accounts
The analysis proposed here crucially relies on a semantics for believe in which it
selects sets of sets of worlds, and both declarative and interrogative clauses denote
objects of such a type. I briefly consider here whether other approaches to the
meaning of believe or can’t believe as a whole could be extended to cover the
empirical data considered in this paper. A full-throated attempt at such an analysis is
unfortunately outside the scope of this paper, but I briefly discuss here some of the
major empirical hurdles that such accounts might face.
5.1 Believe as quantifying over propositions
Spector & Egré (2015), following Lahiri (2002), propose that veridical predicates
compose with questions via existential quantification over propositions. This is,
fundamentally, a reductive account: the meaning of believe q is reduced to some
believe p. A potential benefit, though, is that this gives believe a treatment analogous
to modals, and possibly unificatory with other responsive predicates. A toy lexical
entry for believe in such a view might resemble the following: 11
(44) Jbelieve QK = λx.∃P ∈ Q(x believe P)
If we treat declaratives as denoting singleton sets of propositions (as done by e.g.
Uegaki 2016), then the declarative-embedding properties of believe are preserved.
This approach quickly runs into problems, as there is no reason why believe shouldn’t
always be compatible with embedded interrogatives, absent a concept of inquisitive
11 I abstract away here from whether believe is selecting for propositions or questions. This general
schematic is compatible with a semantics where it selects for questions, or one where propositional
arguments are type-shifted into singleton-set questions.
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negation as in the Theiler et al. (2018) approach. In other words, this line of inquiry
appears not to offer immediately obvious advantages over that of this paper.
A more plausible alternative, however, might be that believe universally quanti-
fies over propositions:
(45) Jbelieve QK = λx.∀P ∈ Q (x believe P)
This will get us the anti-rogativity of believe, since if Q is interrogative, believe Q
is always a contradiction, as people cannot believe multiple answers to the same
question.
At the end of the day, however, reductive accounts (and indeed, all accounts
which do not have a way of deriving subject-certainty presuppositions) struggle
with can’t believe’s veridicality with interrogative complements–it would need to
be stipulated into the semantics of believe, which is problematic given that believe
can also of course ordinarily be negated. While Theiler et al. (2018) derive this
presupposition inherently from their treatment of negation and clausal meaning,
other accoutns face the burden of obtaining this presupposition some other way.
5.2 Can’t believe as hyperbole
A purely compositional analysis (as the one proposed here), runs into its share of
problems. For one, while unbelievable exhibits similar properties to can’t believe,
not believable does not:
(46) a. It’s unbelievable who won the race.
b. ??It’s not believable who won the race.
This is not easily accounted for under the current proposal if not believe and unbe-
lievable are composed of identical semantic ingredients.
One possible explanation for this observation is that there is some degree of
non-compositionality involved; maybe some lexical items can combine veridically
with believe, but not others. For instance, perhaps can’t in can’t believe is receiving
an interpretation in context which is not strictly the sum of the semantic values of
its parts. After all, there are other hyperbolic uses of can’t–can’t wait is used in
contexts where it is not strictly true. A person who utters (47) may not be referring
to their physical inability to wait until tomorrow (indeed, unless they can time travel,
they don’t have much of a choice), but merely their anticipation and excitement.
(47) I can’t wait until tomorrow!
Similarly, a team which is unbeatable is probably still so even if they lose 5% of
the games they play. But if it is indeed the case can’t believe is not interpreted fully
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compositionally, we would need to determine to what extent (if any) compositional
interpretation is involved, and whether this noncompositional interpretation is derived
from particular lexical items, pragmatically, or some other way.
While this line of thinking is potentially fruitful, it ultimately faces some of the
same limitations as a fully idiomatic account. For one, the cross-linguistic robustness
of can’t believe as a construction with particular properties would still raise the
question of whether the use of can’t in a hyperbolic way is also systematically
possible across languages, and if so, why. Above all, a non-compositional approach
must still grapple with the question of what type of complement believe selects
and why interrogatives are not often embeddable under believe in the absence of
particular modal and negation combinations.
6 Conclusion
This paper aims to make two main contributions. The first is an argment that
that believe underlyingly selects interrogative complements, because it can take
interrogative complements under certain circumstances. Following Theiler et al.
(2018) I attribute the fact that believe q is nevertheless usually unacceptable from the
fact that it systematically results in trivial (and therefore unacceptable) meanings,
except in particular semantic contexts.
The second contribution concerns the can’t believe construction. I observed that
can’t believe is (close to) veridical with interrogative complements, which I attributed
to projection of an excluded middle presupposition of believe that reduces to subject-
certainty when believe’s complement is interrogative. The intuitive characterization
of can’t believe as ‘surprise’-denoting arises from a conflict between a speaker-
certainty presupposition and an impossibility-of-speaker-certainty assertion.
This account suggests that some attitude predicates display more permissive
selectional behavior in certain linguistic contexts, an observation which has been
made in recent literature for predicates like be certain and hope (Mayr 2019; White
2019). This is indicative that we might want to consider clausal selection not only as
a restriction on complements imposed by particular lexical predicates, but rather a
bilateral compatibility relation between a predicate and its broader linguistic context,
including its complement.
The arguments in this paper also open a number of exciting possible avenues for
future research. For instance, given the similarity between can’t believe and emotive
factives like be surprised, it is empirically desirable to determine whether the two
can be treated uniformly. Finally, if veridicality can be at least partly decomposable,
as suggested, this approach may shed light on how it arises more generally.
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